Abortion and Infanticide [Michael Tooley] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. This book has two main concerns. The first is to isolate the. text Michael Tooley’s recent book, Abortion and Infanticide Tooley advances his arguments for a liberal position with great so- phistication and in impressive. MICHAEL TOOLEY. Abortion and Infanticide’. This essay deals with the question of the morality of abortion and in- fanticide. The fundamental ethical objection.
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Is this argument valid?
What properties must an organism possess in order to be a person i. Tooley also notes that it might turn out that adult animals belonging to species other than homo sapiens have a right to life. He denies that the fetus is a person.
For example, suppose that I have become deeply, but temporarily, depressed and do not desire to live. Harris – – Journal of Medical Ethics 11 4: Tooley thinks this argument is unsound. That is, if an organism satisfies the SCR, does it follow that the organism is a person? Jeffrey Reiman – – Journal of Social Philosophy 29 2: Lawrence Torcello – – Res Publica 15 1: Is this claim plausible?
Is the argument valid?
Tooley’s immodest proposal: Abortion and Infanticide.
The SCR specifies a necessary condition for personhood. Call this property P. This is a moral question. Sign in Create an account. If an organism potentially possesses P, then the organism has a right to life now.
Separating the Infant From the Fetus. So he would deny 2 and 3. Infanticide and the Liberal View on Abortion. Fiona Woollard – – Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 3: A key step in this argument is premise 3the claim that one has a right to X only if one desires X. But is this claim plausible?
Added to PP index Total downloads 1, of 2, Recent downloads 6 months 35 11, of 2, How can I increase my downloads? We would still want to tpoley that I have a right to life even though I do not now desire to live. Lack of desire due to temporary psychological derangement. A common toooey against abortion: This article has no associated abstract.
We would still want to say that I have right to life.
Xiaofei Liu – – Utilitas 24 1: He holds that fetuses and infants fail to meet the SCR. Reply to Don Marquis’s “Reiman on Abortion”. The fetus topley a person from the moment of conception. Find it on Scholar.
A comment on Tooley’s Abortion and Infanticide.
This is a purely factual question. Devine – – Philosophy 58 Sign in to use this feature. Should Practical Reason Be Tabled? It is clear that fetuses do not satisfy the SCR and, hence, do not have a right to life. The former is zbortion descriptive term; the latter is a moral term.
There is no morally significant difference between intentionally performing B and intentionally refraining from performing A. Abortion and snd are therefore morally permissible unless there are some other objections to these practices. If an organism does not satisfy the SCR, it is not a person. An organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states, and believes that it is itself such a continuing entity.
So they do not have a right to life. Request removal from index. Is the argument sound?