Definite descriptions, I shall argue, have two possible functions. 1] They are used to refer to what a speaker wishes to talk about, but they are also used quite. Keith Donnellan, “Reference and Definite Descriptions”. Due Feb 13, by 10am; Points 5; Submitting a discussion post; Available after Feb 2, at 12am. Keith Sedgwick Donnellan was an American philosopher and Professor ” Reference and Definite Descriptions” has been one of.
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But there are also the existence component descripfions the maximality component to consider. To troubleshoot, please check our FAQsand if you can’t find the answer there, please contact us.
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The interesting feature of this example is that the uniqueness implications of the definite descriptions deecriptions problematic, for they imply that there is a unique satisfier of the description in each event.
Nonexistent ObjectsNew Haven: And, as Donnellan is at pains to emphasize pp. Past, Present and FutureOxford: What one literally expresses in 38 is that the hearer should put a book on a book. As Donnellan notes in section V, this latter point qualifies the earlier one about presuppositions deffinite. So, for example, consider the following cases. Of course it is possible to ask what it means to assert an open sentence, but notice that again we are converging on a view in which an determiners fall out, leaving behind a free variable.
Essays in Honor of Michael DummettOxford: One might suggest that Donnellan is going even further definihe this direction. Stanford University Press, — The argument for this turns on cases where these expressions are embedded in propositional attitude environments, as in 14a and 14b. Consider the option of non-existent objects.
Saul Kripke gave a series desfriptions three lectures at Princeton University inlater published as Naming and Necessity in which he argued against descriptivism geference sketched the causal-historical theory of reference according to which each proper name necessarily designates a particular object and that the identity of the object so designated is determined by the history of the name’s use.
Oxford University Press, 13— Reference and Generality, Ithaca: Classical, Early, and Medieval World History: Consider the following brief dialogue.
Keith Donnellan – Wikipedia
Indeed, as Williams observed, this appearance is even more pronounced if we consider cases like Perhaps there is a single logical element or perhaps just a free drfinite with different pragmatic application conditions. The Case against Two-DimensionalismPrinceton: Edit criterion description Delete criterion reverence. Reprinted in Mysticism and LogicLondon: Now clearly this does not mean that I turned the stove off once in my life, but rather there is intuitively some relevant time when I turned it off—for example, when I left the house this morning.
Fara pursued the possibility that all uses of definite descriptions are predicational—even descriptions in subject position.
Deference will know more pending an investigation. Suppose, moreover, that in characterizing what the speaker said, we ourselves can refer to the object to which the speaker was referring using any tool at our disposal: Someone might be associated with this bundle of properties and not have written the Nichomachean Ethics so long as they had enough of the other properties.
Descriptions (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
A2 An indefinite NP in an argument position, however, ends up denoting an individual, because the semantics involves a free function variable that assigns an individual to the restriction predicate. Publications Pages Publications Pages. In this case the teacher knows that there must have been a unique cheater, but does not know the identity of the cheater and hence does not have singular grounds for the utterance and accordingly is not in a position to communicate the identity of the cheater except under extraordinary circumstances.
As Devitt and Sterelny observe, the three objections to the traditional descriptive theory of names come creeping back.